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The intuitive appeal of learning from  
the past to alter the present
tine destrooper
Examining the past to understand better our present and future and 
even to change the way we act in the present and future, is something 
that has instinctive appeal. The argument is often made that by better 
understanding the context within which past harm took place, and the 
societal factors that contributed to it, we will be better able to recognize 
these circumstances when they re-emerge and be able to prevent harm 
from happening again in the future.
A domain of study and practice that has particularly concerned itself 
with this topic is transitional justice, which asks how societies can 
cope with legacies of large-scale violence. It entails the organization of 
criminal justice proceedings, truth commissions, and memorialization 
initiatives, among other practices. In this article, I explore what the role 
of internment has been in transitional justice: has it been acknowledged 
as a specific rights violation that has a dynamic and logic? How prominent 
is it in the narratives we create about past harm? And how is internment 
memorialized? This is an important question because the logic of inter-
nment can be argued to be vastly different from that of other kinds 
of arbitrary or unlawful detention in that it arguably has a preventive 
function. Its goal is to break the spirit of a group of people considered 
to be “undesirable aliens”, or of possible resistance. As Salwa Ismail 
argues, the political prison or internment camp can be seen as a space 
for the undoing of the political subject and as a referent for the general 
population’s understanding of the terms of rule.1 Structurally and 
operationally, she argues, it is continuous with the polity: it disciplines 
and remakes recalcitrant subjects. This is also why internment sites are 
often in the political, geographical, and juridical hinterland, reflecting 
the extent to which the people put up in them are deemed to “exist beyond 
the nation state, its laws and its protections”. Camps are not always in the 
margins though, and “Spatial arrangements of the edifice of coercive state 
1  Salwa Ismail, The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 194.
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agencies and acts of violence in the everyday” may constitute “a continuity 
between the space of the prison and its outside”. The ubiquitous presence 
of security-service kiosks or the routine assaults by security services on 
ordinary citizens going about their daily chores, for example, has blurred 
the boundaries demarcating the camp and the territory beyond it.2 
Ismail argues that in Syria today these camps, like the Sednaya and Adra 
prison, are indeed used in a manner that is aimed at breaking resistance, 
undoing the political subject, dehumanization, and even as part of a 
politics of annihilation. In such a context, Lyndsey Stonebridge refers to 
internment as marking the end of rights and, as such, a potential “prelude 
to genocide”.3
In this article I explore the way in which internment has been dealt with 
by several transitional justice mechanisms. This is important because 
these mechanisms have a “definitional” potential. As Zinaida Miller 
argues, “Transitional justice as both literature and practice offers more 
than just a set of neutral instruments for the achievement of the goals of 
justice, truth and reconciliation. It also serves to narrate conflict and peace, 
voice and silence, tolerable structural violence and intolerable physical 
atrocity. Ultimately, transitional justice is a definitional project, explaining 
who has been silenced by delineating who may now speak, describing past 
violence by deciding what and who will be punished.”4 I first zoom in on 
two cornerstones of the transitional justice architecture: trials and truth 
commissions, before turning to the broader domain of memorialization. 
Then I take a step back and reflect on what this means for how we think 
about justice and injustice.
The forward-looking role of backward-looking mechanisms
Transitional justice, as both a phenomenon and a conceptual tool, is 
regarded as inevitable and commonplace for anyone wishing to address 
the issue of past human rights violations.5 In the domain of transitional 
justice an assumption of linear progress from a violent past towards a 
2  Ibid., 194.
3  Lyndsey Stonebridge, Placeless People: Writings, Rights, and Refugees (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 47.
4  Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility”, International Journal of Transitional Justice 17, no. 
2 (2008): 267.
5  Siphiwe Ignatius Dube, “Transitional Justice beyond the Normative: Towards a 
Literary Theory of Political Transitions”, International Journal of Transitional Justice 5, no. 2 
(2011): 178.
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more peaceful future is foundational, the logic being that we need to deal 
with that violent past – in a variety of ways – to arrive at a more just and 
peaceful future.6 To this end, standardized interpretations of transitional 
justice encompass a range of practices and mechanisms, among other 
things, tribunals, truth commissions, reparations, institutional reform, 
constitutional reform, memorialization practices, and official apologies. 
Here I focus on tribunals and truth commissions, not only because of their 
importance in transitional justice, but also because they raise interesting 
questions regarding our positioning on a violent past. They do so because 
they contain both a backward-looking logic (for example, finding out 
about past harm in order to hold perpetrators accountable) and a forward-
looking logic which is aimed at preventing violence from happening 
again.7 The growing importance of this forward-looking role means that 
a range of practices that was initially conceived of as mostly backward-
looking have been recast and reinterpreted in ways that also imbue them 
with a forward-looking role. This growing attention to forward-looking 
and preventive functions can be attributed to the fact that forty per cent of 
all countries where some or all of the measures in the transitional justice 
toolkit were implemented saw a relapse to violence within five years of 
signing peace agreements, making prevention a crucial consideration. 
Given the resources and institutional constraints of transitional justice 
mechanisms, it would be essential to focus on empowering citizen and 
former victims to take the justice process forward after the international 
actors leave, rather than “doing justice” in a retrospective manner within 
the liminal space of the transitional justice intervention.
The forward-looking function is most obvious in the case of trials, 
where a guilty verdict is argued as justified not only on retributive grounds 
(“it’s the right thing to do”, “because the perpetrator deserves it”), but 
also for its deterrent effect on future perpetrators. Retribution theories are 
backward-looking, deterrence theories forward-looking and expressivist: 
the verdict sends a message, as Mark Drumbl has written.8 (Semi-)judicial 
6  Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16, 
no. 1 (2003); Marcos Zunino, Justice Framed: A Genealogy of Transitional Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019).
7  Jeremy Sarkin, “Redesigning the Definition of a Truth Commission, but also 
designing a forward-looking Non-Prescriptive Definition to make them potentially more 
Successful”, Human Rights Review 19, no. 3 (2018).
8  Mark Drumbl, “The Expressive Value of prosecuting and punishing Terrorists: 
Handman, the Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal Law”, George Washington 
Law Review 75 (2006): 1170.
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proceedings can, however, also express messages in a more indirect 
manner. Carsten Stahn, in this context, calls international criminal 
justice a hallmark of social performance that creates social meaning 
and opportunities for shaping new narratives about past harm, and for 
reaching new audiences with messages about (what can be expected of) 
justice. Both deterrence and expressivist theories stand in opposition to 
views like that of Hannah Arendt that “the purpose of a trial is to render 
justice and nothing else”.9
This article inscribes itself in that expressivist turn in that it is concerned 
with the pedagogical value and legitimating qualities of justice processes.10 
Judicial proceedings play an expressive role when they apply and interpret 
laws and regulations. As such, they serve more than a legal purpose in that 
they also convey a moral judgment. Their extra-legal function then consists 
of sending an aspirational message about the norms and values that are 
deemed most relevant in a society, and also about what we consider to be 
outside the realm of justice.11
This attention to expressivist functions of (semi-)judicial processes 
has also shaped the domain of transitional justice, which has increasingly 
been considered to be a definitional project.12 Below I explore the 
extent to which these trials and truth commissions organized as part of 
a transitional justice process have been inclined to consider the issue of 
internment as a – sui generis – rights violation.
Trials
Following the end of a violent conflict, criminal justice proceedings are 
typically organized to hold perpetrators to account for past crimes. While 
having an obvious punitive function of establishing legal guilt, they also 
have the extra-legal expressive functions just described: often these 
processes play a role in later memorialization efforts, reparation orders, 
9  Carsten Stahn, Justice as Message: Expressivist Foundations of International Criminal Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on 
the Banality of Evil (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964).
10  Peter Goodrich, “Rhetoric as Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the Politics of Legal 
Language”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4, no. 1 (1984); Barrie Sander, “The Expressive 
Turn of International Criminal Justice: A Field in Search of Meaning”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 32, no. 4 (2019): 851–72.
11  Tim Meijers and Marlies Glasius, “Trials as Messages of Justice: What should be 
expected of International Criminal Courts?”, Ethics and International Affairs 30 (2016): 433.
12  Miller, “Effects of Invisibility”, 267.
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or even social mobilization or media reporting about the case. They play an 
important role in shaping our understanding of what is considered a crime 
and what is not. While legal practitioners of course have no monopoly 
over setting this historical record, it could easily be argued that, due to the 
status of these processes, they authoritatively shape the historical record, 
which may later influence other initiatives. Moreover, Lorraine Bannai, 
writing on Japanese-American internment, for example, has put forward 
the idea that an important motivation to go to court for many victims is that 
“The stories of those interned are worth remembering so that those who 
might be unfairly cast as the enemy today will not stand alone.”13
Randle DeFalco argues that these processes, and international criminal 
justice more generally, tend to prioritize crimes that are at the same 
time “spectacular and recognizable”, and to pay less attention to more 
structural, indirect or socio-economic kinds of harm.14 Internment, in 
that sense, is an issue which easily fits international criminal proceedings’ 
parameters of legibility.
Yet, explicit references to internment as such are rare, with most 
transitional justice literature as well as court documents treating intern-
ment in a more general sense under the established legal categories of 
arbitrary or unlawful detention, not as a crime sui generis.
In the rulings of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal, for example, 
there is exactly one mention of internment, when they refer to the 
intentional and arbitrary imprisonment without legal basis in the 
infamous Tuol Sleng S-21 prison, which was de facto an internment camp 
for – perceived – enemies of the party. In using the term “internment”, the 
Tribunal acknowledged internment as a specific type of crime, different 
from related crimes such as other forms of arbitrary detention. Yet, at the 
same time, the court did not go so far as to seize the opportunity explicitly 
to condemn internment per se or in principle, instead ruling merely that 
there were no legal grounds or security requirements to justify detention 
in specific cases. The court structured its reasoning around the fact that 
babies and small children were among the detainees, who could objectively 
speaking not have posed a security threat or otherwise “have been guilty of 
13  Lorraine Bannai, “Taking the Stand: The Lessons of the Three Men Who Took the 
Japanese American Internment to Court”, Seattle Journal for Social Justice 4, no. 1 (2005).
14  Randle Defalco, “Justice and Starvation in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge Famine”, 
Cambodia Law and Policy Journal 3 (2014); see also Evelyne Schmid, Taking Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Seriously in International Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015).
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any offence”. Given how many people were tortured and detained in Tuol 
Sleng because they were believed to possess information or to be “enemies 
of the state”, the court left an opportunity untapped by not investigating, 
or condemning, the situation and detention of those who were perceived 
as enemies of the state, or potential bearers of information.
Where court cases do explicitly revolve around internment, they often 
follow a logic of sequencing. This means that those crimes which are 
considered the gravest are dealt with first, and other issues are prosecuted 
at a later stage, often decades later. This has been the case in Chile, as well 
as, for example, in the United States. There, two cases were brought to court 
at the time that internment orders against Japanese-American citizens 
were being issued. These orders set in motion the mass transportation 
and relocation of more than 120,000 Japanese people to camps that were 
set up and occupied in about fourteen weeks. A Supreme Court ruling on 
Hirabayashi was issued in 1943, upholding the constitutionality of military 
curfew against a minority group as a military necessity. Another case that 
was brought to court in 1944 concerned the actual internment order.15 But 
it was not until 1983 that there was a first judicial acknowledgment of 
the gravity of these rights violations, when the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) supported one of the plaintiffs, Fred Korematsu, and was 
granted the petition.16 Also in this case there was no sweeping principled 
condemnation of internment as such. Instead, the court granted the 
petition because it acknowledged that the government had knowingly and 
willingly withheld full information on the case in 1944.
This case is also relevant because it is exemplary of the wished-for cross-
fertilization between backward-looking and forward-looking functions 
of legal proceedings: on the one hand, Fred Korematsu initially brought 
the case to court to seek legal accountability from those who had violated 
his rights (thus, a backward-looking goal and one related to his obvious 
personal stake in the matter). On the other hand, his legal mobilization 
of 1943–44 eventually led to his further legal and societal mobilization 
through his work in the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations. 
As Lorraine Bannai remarks, “At that point, Fred was transformed from 
someone who simply wanted to live free to someone committed to fighting 
the internment in court.”17 He wanted to see legislation to prevent these 
15  See Peter Irons, Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese-American Internment Cases (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).
16  Bannai, “Taking the Stand”, 32.
17  Ibid., 10–11.
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kinds of issues from happening again. This is one case in which initial 
legal activism led to future human rights activism.
It is one of the few cases though where internment was explicitly dealt 
with and approached sui generis. Despite the magnitude of this injustice 
and its massive impact on the individual, the society, and the polity, 
a sequencing logic often pushes this crime down the line, and when 
criminal justice procedures do address it, it is often treated under the 
same established legal categories as other kinds of unlawful or arbitrary 
detention. This risks invisibilizing the fundamentally different nature and 
logic of internment, which is particularly worrying if we see these tribunals 
and courts as definitional instances with forward-looking and expressive 
functions. The question then arises of what kind of acknowledgment is 
taking place in the vast majority of cases that fail to treat internment sui 
generis. Later in this article, I return to this question by linking it to the 
notion of visibility politics and justice imagination.
Truth-seeking
First, however, I focus on another transitional justice mechanism whose 
primary function was also a backward-looking one, but which has 
increasingly been framed and lauded because of its alleged forward-
looking and preventive potential, namely truth commissions.
Nunca mas (“never again”) reports emerged all over Latin America in the 
mid-1990s and early 2000s, following bloody dictatorships that often led 
to large-scale killings, disappearances, torture, displacement, and in some 
cases genocide. These reports had as their explicit goal to document and 
bring to the fore the nature and extent of human rights violations that took 
place to prevent them from ever happening again. It is interesting that in 
these reports the future is imagined in terms of the absence of something 
bad – Nunca más, nie wieder, never again – rather than in terms of the 
presence of something desirable, such as better protection of economic, 
social, and cultural rights, or the conceptualization of positive freedom.18
Truth commissions are often seen as having a distinct role in writing 
what Michael Humphrey has called a “first draft of history”,19 in which 
victim memory is transformed into public knowledge through testimony. 
18  See Ann Rigney, “Remembering Hope: Transnational Activism Beyond the 
Traumatic”, Memory Studies 11, no. 3 (2018): 369.
19  Michael Humphrey, The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror to Trauma (New 
York: Routledge, 2002).
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Such a view, Simon Robins argues, represents a highly positivist 
under standing of history, and indeed of the capacity for memory to 
be unambiguously corralled into a narrative that can effectively and 
uncontroversially serve a pre-determined purpose.20
Similar to criminal justice proceedings, the mandates and reports of 
truth commissions tend not to mention internment explicitly, instead 
capturing it under more general sections regarding arbitrary arrests, 
inhumane treatment, or other broader references to unlawful detention. 
This again risks invisibilizing internment as a specific crime that is in its 
finality, perhaps not legally but analytically, different from the broader 
other types of crimes that it is framed as here.
The US is again an example of where a truth-seeking body was explicitly 
mandated to focus on internment. The Commission on War-Time 
Relocation and Internment of Citizens, created by Congress in 1982 to 
conduct a government study on the policies and effect of placing Japanese 
Americans in internment camps during the Second World War, was not 
a classic truth commission but a historical clarification commission. It 
was established with the intention of informing the public about these 
facts and providing reparations. As many as 750 people testified and there 
were several public hearings, which resulted in a report concluding that 
the internment of Japanese Americans had not been justified by military 
necessity and constituted a grave injustice. Most of its recommendations 
were implemented, including the passage of legislation, such as the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988. This is also one of the few instances where a 
government apologized publicly and explicitly for the specific crime of 
internment, and where a public education fund and reparations revolved 
around, and named, the crime of internment specifically.
The Commission on War-Time Relocation and Internment of Citizens 
also shows that its forward-looking function lay in its concrete proposals, 
such as new legislation that would prevent the crime from happening 
again, and in its rhetoric that foregrounded internment and sought to raise 
awareness about its specificities as opposed to other detention crimes. 
None of the other truth commissions examined for this article so much as 
mention the term explicitly in their mandates, and hardly refer to it in their 
reports. This is striking considering that, as Zinaida Miller argues, “The 
mandate of a commission or the list of crimes to be tried at a court means 
20  Simon Robins, “Introduction”, in Transitional Justice in Tunisia: Lessons for Global Practice, 
ed. Simon Robins and Paul Gready (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021).
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that, to some degree, the decision about what story to tell is predetermined 
. . . The power to define the discourse of violation, the vocabulary of outrage 
and the appropriateness of dissatisfaction lies largely within the realm of 
transitional justice mechanisms, which deploy the human rights norms 
that originally constituted them. This power has been underestimated in 
many ways, and the repetition of particular crimes or certain indictable 
offences through both courts and commissions may have unexpected 
effects beyond the standard debates.”21 Miller’s statement sheds light 
on how problematic it is not to acknowledge internment as sui generis in 
the mandates and reports of truth commissions. She also denounces the 
extent to which these commissions overlook the structural and socio-
economic violence and marginalization that often precedes more blatant 
rights violations by rendering whole groups of people vulnerable to gross 
violations of their rights. By omitting certain issues from the discourse, 
these bodies are, at least implicitly, defining what should be considered a 
crime and what will cause moral outrage.
A forward-looking memory
Narratives of past harm are, of course, not only shaped by (semi-)judicial 
bodies, which are not the only definitional interface between the past 
and the present. Other transitional justice mechanisms (as well as non-
transitional justice processes, such as journalists’ reports) also play a 
role in shaping these narratives. Here I concentrate on memorialization 
practices and memorial museums in particular, as these have been 
receiving growing attention in the domain of transitional justice because 
of their alleged forward-looking potential.
Memorial museums, for example, are increasingly promoted under 
transitional justice’s banner of guarantees of non-recurrence, as their 
status moved from a mostly backward-looking function of documenting, 
archiving, and making information about past crimes publicly available, 
to a more forward-looking one of playing a role in challenging or even 
preventing human rights abuses that are taking place today. I discuss them 
under a separate heading here because their forward-looking function lies 
exclusively in their expressive potential to shape narratives (unlike courts 
whose forward-looking function can also lie in their deterrent function or 
option to issue reparation orders), and because establishing a historical 
narrative that can positively affect the present and the future is, in fact, a 
21  Miller, “Effects of Invisibility”, 276.
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key concern for most memorial museums.
The growing importance of memorial museums, Huyssen argues, 
coincides with a broader societal interest in memory, memory sites, and 
memorialization. He calls this “the emergence of memory as a key concern 
in Western societies”. Since the 1980s, many scholars have described this 
“boom” in both memory and memory studies.22 Alongside the concern 
with memory writ large came a concern with and interest in remembering, 
memorialization, and remembrance education.
This can partly be understood by reference to our “civic duty to know” 
about the harms that have been inflicted in our names, the violations 
that have been carried out by our governments under the banner of 
guaranteeing our liberal democratic values, and the policies that have 
harmed others in order to guarantee our freedom. As Amy Sodaro puts it, 
“Memorial museums focused on past violence, atrocity, and human rights 
abuses reflect a demand today that those darkest days in human history are 
not only preserved but musealized and interpreted in a way that is widely 
accessible to present and future audiences.”23
From the start, however, this turn to memory was not only about the 
civic duty to know. Whether we consider historical memory education, 
memorials, or memorial museums, there seems to be an underlying 
assumption that well-designed and well-implemented interventions in 
the domain of remembrance provide opportunities to engage critically 
in comparative and prospective reflection, that, in other words, these 
remembrance and memorialization initiatives can provide lessons for the 
present and the future. In all these examples, the assumption is strong that 
history can, and indeed must, be used to shape not just our understanding 
but also our affects and actions; that either through careful historical 
analysis and comparison (for example, on the psychology of obedience, the 
dynamics of othering, the relation between structural and direct violence), 
or, in contrast, through a more emotive approach, we can plausibly impact 
the present and the future. There has, thus, always been an assumption 
that remembrance and memorialization can inform our behaviour in 
the present. That assumption also encompasses the aspiration of using 
22  Andreas Huyssen, “Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia”, Public Culture 12, no. 1 
(2000): 28. See also Michael Lambek and Paul Antze, “Introduction: Forecasting Memory”, 
in Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory, ed. Paul Antze and Michael Lambek (New 
York: Routledge, 1996), xi–xxx.
23  Amy Sodaro, Memorial Museums and the Politics of Past Violence (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 2018), 3.
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history to challenge or even prevent today’s human rights abuses.
Memorial museums, for instance, including the Japanese-American 
internment museum in Arkansas or the Tuol Sleng prison museum and 
memorial site just outside Phnom Penh, are meant to be institutions that 
morally educate their visitors, and promote human rights and an ethic 
of “never again”. That this particular cultural form of commemoration 
is increasingly used globally as one of the central mechanisms for 
addressing past violence, Sodaro argues, suggests that it is believed to 
be an especially effective mode for critical engagement with the past that 
can translate into a more democratic and peaceful present and future. 
These memorial museums reflect the prevalent assumption that there is 
a causal relationship between learning about past violence and preventing 
it in the future. Not only do memorial museums intellectually educate 
their audiences about history, but they also seek to reach their visitors 
emotionally in order to transform them morally so that they embrace 
the ethic of “never again”. Behind each museum is the claim that it is 
an essential part of building democratic culture and preventing future 
violence and atrocity through its creation of a more informed moral public 
that will work towards these goals.24
According to the Colombian National Museum of Memory, for example, 
one of the core functions of memorial museums is to contribute to the 
construction of a culture of respect for difference, diversity, and plurality, 
or, as its mission statement puts it, “harnessing the memory and history 
of the violent past in a way that shapes the present and future”. Such a 
description, however, hardly sheds light on the extent to which memorial 
museums, much like tribunals and truth commissions, are deeply political 
institutions, which are often created and utilized with specific political 
agendas that can (and often do) compromise their declared efforts openly 
to confront and learn from the past. Sodaro goes on to demonstrate, 
moreover, that memorial museums, rather than educating about the past, 
tend to reveal the political priorities and goals of the regimes that build 
them, reminding us that memory still resides in the domain of the nation-
state, with the past being simply another arena for enacting present 
politics.25
This concern over politicization becomes all the more relevant as 
remembering and memorializing violent pasts increasingly came to be seen 
24  Ibid.
25  Ibid.
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as pathways towards more peaceful futures, and even as a precondition for 
democratic and inclusive societies. For one, (political) pressure increased 
for the state to be involved in these specific kinds of memory practices, 
the idea being that memorialization and remembering is an obligation.26 
More importantly, as remembrance and memorialization increasingly 
came to be seen as the sole focus of our engagement with tragedies of 
the past, the risk increased of the past becoming locked into itself, and 
memorialization becoming a largely stale conversation or symbolic 
ritual, rather than a lived understanding or practice. This challenges the 
possibility of drawing lessons for the future.27 The kind of remembering 
that happens in such a context, moreover, does not always find it easy to 
rely on a version of history that is multi-vocal, multi-directional, multi-
layered, or otherwise complex or disruptive of our existing frameworks for 
thinking about the past, and more broadly for thinking normatively about 
what we condemn. Huyssen argues that what is at stake is the distinction 
between usable pasts and disposable data.28 Yet when the transitory, 
incomplete, and complex nature of memorialization is brushed over, the 
version of the past that emerges is a curated “recognizable” one that does 
not easily accommodate cognitive or affective friction or dissonance, but 
instead serves as a basis for learning straightforward moral and political 
lessons about the present. Such a version of the past is often characterized 
by micro-studies that confirm our knowledge and views of the past, 
and that give us a feeling of “moral certainty and security”.29 This risks 
blurring the thin line that exists between “the real and the mythical past”.30 
As Simon Robins posits, “acknowledging the importance of memory as 
a subjective record of the past alongside history, liberates history from 
sovereign power and drives an emancipatory approach in which history 
can in principle become something collaboratively created at multiple 
social levels”.31 We should, therefore, not only commemorate and 
memorialize the past, but also analyse how the past is invoked, so that we 
can better challenge its instrumentalization.
26  Berber Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2011).
27  Marc Reynebeau, “Zo Is Hitler Ook Begonnen”, in Onvoltooid Verleden Tijd: Antidotum 
Tegen Historisch Geheugenverlies, ed. Ivo Janssens (Bornmeer: Sterck & De Vreese, 2020).
28  Huyssen, “Present Pasts”, 28.
29  Nico Wouters, “Historici Moeten Hun Eigen Agenda Heroveren”, De Standaard, 11 May 
2019.
30  Huyssen, “Present Pasts”, 26.
31  Robins, “Introduction”.
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This also raises questions about how lessons could be learnt, or how 
insights about the past might alter how we understand and act on our 
present-day realities. The intuitive appeal and normative imperative 
of memorialization and remembrance have often obscured the need 
to think systematically and analytically about how to ensure that these 
memory practices have the best chance of making any kind of impact 
on our understanding of, and actions in, the present and future. This 
question is particularly pertinent to historical memory education but, 
essentially, underlies all memory practices that seek to have a forward-
looking function. By historical memory education I mean programmes 
linking peace education, human rights education, democratic citizenship 
education, and Holocaust education to ask how we can take insights from 
past massive human rights violations in order to prevent them in the 
future.
One logic often cited in this regard is that critically engaging with 
the past nourishes other forms of critical thinking. But this requires 
precisely the kind of intellectual friction and disruption that is not easily 
accommodated in official (and often politicized) memorialization and 
remembrance programmes. Several state-of-the-art memorial museums, 
for example, are conceptualized in ways that seem to facilitate commem-
orative forms that can express a more ambiguous relationship to the 
violence of the past, but at the same time also clearly attempt to pass down 
pre-determined lessons, mostly about democratic values like freedom, 
tolerance, human rights, and the prevention of future violence. Yet, this 
second goal intuitively seems to clash with the open-endedness and 
ambiguity implied in the first.
Another logic revolves around the notion of empathy, and is pinned 
to the idea that memorialization, remembrance, and historical memory 
education can also instil a sense of empathy with victims of ongoing rights 
violations.
While both avenues are plausible, the theories of change or pathways of 
impact underlying them are markedly under-specified and we have little 
sound empirical evidence telling us which approaches work best under 
which circumstances. Should historical memory education focus more 
on cognitive aspects, on soliciting empathy with victims of abuses, or on 
empowering people to speak up or claim their rights? What do we see as 
a success in terms of, for example, historical memory education? And can 
we ever (even hope to) measure the effect of our efforts in this extremely 
complex area? If our concern with memorialization and remembrance 
 . . . learning from the past to alter the present 31
revolves around the ambition of learning from the past to alter the future, 
we need urgently to answer these questions, and produce sound empirical 
research on how effects are likely to come about in a sustainable way. As 
Anja Mihr posited in 2015, if we want historical memory education to teach 
more than feeling empathy with the victims, and if it is to be more than 
simply a history lesson, then better measurement of impacts and more 
research on pathways of impact are needed.32
The other option is to be more cautious about an overly instrumental 
or positivist interpretation of why remembrance and memorialization 
are important, and to revalue “our civic duty to know” and to engage with 
the past in critical ways that allow for cognitive and affective friction, and 
that do justice to multi-vocality, multi-directionality, and complexity. 
To address this question, I explore how narratives shape our justice 
imagination.33
The narratives that shape our justice imagination
Earlier I argued that formal transitional justice interventions with an 
instrumental view of ensuring accountability for past harm, as well as 
remembrance and memorialization initiatives in the cultural domain, can 
be understood as definitional projects that narrate the violence of the past, 
and shape what causes moral outrage. I have also argued that attention to 
the specific dynamics of internment is virtually absent, especially from 
the more formal transitional justice mechanisms, which tend not to 
distinguish between the dynamics and intentionality of internment and 
those of other forms of unlawful detention. This is related to the difficulty 
for judicial and semi-judicial proceedings to account for experiences 
which are not formally codified in law. They create narratives from which 
the subject of internment is virtually absent or not acknowledged as sui 
generis. Such narratives narrow our understanding of the past, and at the 
same time influence what crimes will in future cause moral outrage.
In this last section, therefore, I focus on the issue of narratives and what 
they do to our understanding of harm and injustice. This is not to argue that 
narratives are the most important thing transitional justice interventions 
32  Anja Mihr, “Why Holocaust Education is not always Human Rights Education”, 
Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 4 (2015): 525.
33  Brigitte Herremans and Tine Destrooper, “Stirring the Justice Imagination: Counter-
ing the Invisibilization and Erasure of Syrian Victims’ Justice Narratives”, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, forthcoming paper.
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create. Indeed, as Siphiwe Dube has argued, these narratives, impactful 
as they are, “must always be accompanied by other forms of responses, 
such as structural changes and political commitments to social justice”.34 
However, we should also acknowledge these narratives themselves as 
normative signifiers. Exploring how they operate in society can balance an 
overly positivist and instrumental reading of the past, as well as exploring 
how the past and present can interact in producing scenarios for the future 
without falling back into grand narratives.35 This is not only a question 
of what we consider as harm and injustice, but also of how we narrate 
violence and harm, both within and beyond the legal arena.
I have already hinted at the importance of narratives from the standpoint 
of expressivist theories of the law and of justice processes. Narratives are 
also crucial if we consider that in each of the mechanisms described the 
process of having one’s suffering acknowledged as a crime or as a gross 
violation of rights, as well as the struggle to find historical, legal, and 
political recognition, is essentially a testimonial one. Lyndsey Stonebridge 
has argued that if today we have so much memory just to start to work 
with, it is because witness testimony was placed at the heart of the judicial 
processes, starting with the Eichmann trial in 1961 and the trials following 
it.36 She goes on to argue that Eichmann’s trial was in fact the first time in 
history that a legal process was tied to claims of collective memory. And 
this starts to hint at the intersection between the various mechanisms 
of dealing with the past that I have been talking about: the witness 
testimonies provided during trials and the testimonies given during truth 
commissions (together with expert studies) often form the basis of further 
“musealization”, and remembrance and memorialization practices, for 
example. Today most agree that it is through hearing the testimony of 
victims that the need for justice is felt most keenly. However, this practice 
seems to be grounded in an empathic imperative, an imperative to witness 
and absorb the suffering of the other; that raises the question of how soon 
before it falters, before the fantasy of the deserving and undeserving victim 
sets in if we too readily subscribe to narratives that brush over complexities. 
This question is particularly relevant when talking about the internment of 
people who not long before were cast as enemies of the nation.
Yet, this narrative style that presents itself as univocal and stable is 
34  Dube, “Transitional Justice beyond the Normative”, 195.
35  See also Rigney, “Remembering Hope”, 370.
36  Lyndsey Stonebridge, The Judicial Imagination: Writing after Nuremberg (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 3.
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what is preferred in both formal transitional justice mechanisms such 
as courts or truth commissions, as well as in more informal (or formal) 
memorialization and remembrance practices. This goes to the question of 
whether judicial rhetoric can ever aspire to have the capacity to allow for a 
testimonial style that is adequate to the subject who suffered unspeakable 
harm. Hannah Arendt, for example, argued that the real history of the 
camps must be told, but questioned whether this testimony could have 
a political-juridical value in a courtroom whose rhetoric and logic is 
notoriously ill-equipped to accommodate these stories and even these 
realities. This should not be read as a matter of locking suffering out of the 
political or judicial realm, nor as an attempt to make victims voiceless, but 
rather as an attempt to expose the limits of courtroom rhetoric, the politics 
of the use of the traumatized voice, and the perceived moral void at the 
heart of legal reasoning, which tends to be grounded in moral absolutism.37
The difficulty and even impossibility of putting the experience of the 
camps into the language demanded by a court is a lamentation heard from 
Second World War victims to witnesses at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal or the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Indeed, 
as Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam show in their work on the 
ICTY, the more the classic language of the trial seeks to represent trauma, 
the more it is actually unable to connect with that reality – a reality of injury 
so grave that it cannot be expressed in the legal language at hand, but only 
articulated as traumatic experience, in a different moral realm altogether.38
These arguments raise concerns about the limit of what can be under-
stood about the injuries of others, especially within a courtroom. If the 
arguments are linked to the previous section about the expressive function 
of the law, they also raise concerns about what we perceive as harm and as 
injustice, and thus about what we imagine a more just future would look 
like.
Lyndsey Stonebridge’s notion of “judicial imagination” is useful to 
start addressing this concern. She uses the notion to explore how we can 
imagine justice in cases of all-out trauma and violence, and how we can 
avoid falling into the legal phantasy that large-scale violence can be tried 
or addressed exclusively through the law. Building on this notion, I invoke 
the concept of “justice imagination”, to also capture the role played by 
non-judicial mechanisms in shaping our faculty to generate new ideas 
37  Ibid., discussing Arendt, 9.
38  Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, “Silencing Hearings? Victim-Wit-
nesses at War Crimes Trials”, European Journal of International Law 15, no. 1 (2004): 151–77.
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about how to curb injustices. And it might stretch the boundaries of what 
is conceivable in terms of justice, beyond present mechanisms and even 
beyond the judicial realm.39 Such broader understanding would be a 
means to overcome the limits of legal reasoning. In a maximalist sense, 
a more ambitious justice imagination could refer to foraging for more 
encompassing justice narratives (either within or beyond existing justice 
mechanisms) that could accommodate the lived experiences of victims in 
a comprehensive manner. In a minimalist sense, it could refer to resisting 
the erasure or invisibilization of certain experiences from justice narratives 
that are heavily shaped either by legal language (which therefore do not 
treat internment as a specific category) or by stakeholders imposing their 
own (political) agendas onto memory practices, thereby rendering them 
less fruitful.
A crucial question to that end is whether and how we can move from 
trying to mould witness testimony about “the unspeakable”, and also 
victims’ aspirations for justice, into existing legal formats, towards a 
situation in which bearing witness can start to open up and push the 
boundaries of these legal avenues, to carve out space for a new language, 
a more ambitious justice imagination. This is not a plea for emotive 
narratives that solicit empathy, but instead for us to examine how we can 
allow for narratives that lack a stable referent or progressive linearity. 
Indeed, a language that better captures suffering, and thus solicits first an 
empathic reaction is likely not to facilitate the kind of analytical response 
that would be needed to understand this experience – or its causes in 
broader socio-economic and ideological conditions. What narrative mode 
is capacious enough, then, to open up the justice imagination on the basis 
of acknowledging lived experiences?
Here again Arendt can be an inspiration. In her discussion of Rahel 
Varnhagen’s work, she proposes that what is needed is a poetic language, 
in the sense of a new language in which all the words have lost their 
banality, that is, their usual historical overuse. She refers to Varnhagen’s 
idea that “only in the deliverance and total purity of poetry, which 
speaks every word as if for the first time, can she take language into 
herself, entrust herself to language . . . ungoverned by any tradition, any 
conventional norm.”40 Stonebridge summarizes Arendt’s proposal as 
that judgments should not be just a matter of applying legal reasoning, 
39 Herremans and Destrooper, “Stirring the Justice Imagination”.
40 Arendt, cited in Stonebridge, Placeless People, 62.
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but should be reflective and imaginative, bringing our relationship with 
objects and concepts out into the open.41 Along the same lines, Dube 
argues that “Fictional narratives are useful precisely because they offer 
polysemic descriptions of transitional moments, thereby bearing witness 
to these moments’ complicated nature”.42 Both hint at the importance of 
reimagining the relation between language and justice, between narrative 
and judgment.
Where do we go from here?
The discussion here underlines the importance of interrogating our 
own role as a community of scholars and practitioners in creating and 
furthering narratives that leave entire dimensions of past human rights 
abuses undiscussed, and that can lead to invisibilization or erasure. 
This is important in the first place because of our “civic duty to know”, 
but even more so because of the increasing emphasis on the forward-
looking function of transitional justice mechanisms in general, and 
memorialization and remembrance in particular. I have argued that much 
work remains to be done by those making a positivist claim about the 
instrumental value of memory practices in establishing the most plausible 
pathways of impact.
Yet, whether one starts from the civic duty to know or from a more 
instrumental concern with forward-looking effects, it is crucial to 
scrutinize what we explicitly define as an injustice and how we discuss 
those injustices. This is particularly important if one considers the 
expressive function of the law. Contrary to Arendt’s argument that trials 
should not be treated as awareness-raising tools or as instances that write 
an authoritative historical account, but merely as establishing legal guilt, 
I have emphasized here the vast extent to which these judicial and semi-
judicial mechanisms in practice have an expressive function and do serve 
as a definitional project, bracketing off what comes to be seen later as 
an injustice. This brings us back to the issue of internment – and to the 
question of learning from the past to prevent violations from taking place 
in the future.
Japanese Americans who were interned have received token compensa-
tion and a formal apology for their years of internment. Lorraine Bannai 
argues, however, that they have not received what many of them really 
41  Ibid.
42  Dube, “Transitional Justice Beyond the Normative”, 195.
36 tine destrooper
sought: assurance that a similar injustice will never occur again. This was 
their demand, and was explicitly inscribed in Title 6 of the Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988.43 In fact, in 2019 some commentators referred to internment 
once again, as news from the US-Mexican border shocked the world. The 
US was reported to have about 30,000 people in what is euphemistically 
called “administrative immigration detention”, casting these individuals 
as criminals who pose a threat to the security of the nation, justifying their 
detention as a preventive measure, and excluding them from access to 
civil or human rights. Seventy-five years after the internment of Japanese 
Americans, the country was vilifying, and the government was detaining, 
groups of individuals based on their ethnic affiliations. Suspicion was cast 
on individuals who “looked like” the enemy. The reference to internment 
triggered a fierce debate about whether these camps could be equated with 
internment camps. This debate sometimes got stranded in definitional 
battles that obscured the extent to which, as Stonebridge argues, 
historically there is nothing unusual about these kinds of camps becoming 
other kinds of camps – internment camps, for example.44
Both present-day and past examples of this kind of violation of 
human rights should not be invisibilized, neither narratively nor in the 
practice of and mobilization for justice. To grasp fully their complexity, 
we need to adopt a language – in legal forums and beyond – that allows 
for the acknowledgment of their complexity and transient nature, as 
well as accounting for their embeddedness in dynamics of othering, 
dehumanization, and societal polarization, and structural and cultural 
violence, which often precedes more gross crimes and human rights 
violations.
43  Bannai, “Taking the Stand”, 34.
44  Stonebridge, Placeless People.
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